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I

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents incorporate here, as their Statement of Facts,
the Findings of Fact entered by the trial court.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court adjudicated the conflicting claims of the
parties and quieted title to the subject property in the parties
based upon the strength of the showing made by each party as to
its title.

The evidence demonstrates, and the trial court found,

that no party proved simultaneous possession and payment of taxes
on any parcel for the requisite period to perfect adverse possession.

The evidence demonstrates and the Court found that a

1940 tax deed in favor of Robert and Gilbert Kimball, as amended
by a 1976 quit claim deed, constituted the only valid root of
title

to

the

subject

property,

and

quieted

title

in

the

successors of Robert and Gilbert Kimball and partitioned the
property pursuant to the prayer of the Respondents.
The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree are
amply

supported

by the record

and accurately

constitute the

judgment of the trial court.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY QUIETED TITLE IN THE PARTIES
BASED UPON THE STRENGTH OF EACH PARTY'S CLAIM OF INTEREST
The fundamental rule in a quiet title action is that each
Claimant must prevail on the strength of its own title and not on
the weakness of its adversary's title.

Babcock v. Dangerfield,

94 P2d. 862 (Utah, 1939) , Homeowners Loan Corporation v. Dudley,
141 P2d. 160 (Utah, 1943), Mercur Coalition Mining Co. v. Cannon,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

184 P2d. 341

(Utah, 1947),

Colman v. Butkovich, 538 P.2d. 188

(Utah, 1975), Ash v. State, 572 P.2d. 1374 (Utah, 1977), Church
v. Meadow Springs Ranch Corporation, Inc., 659 P.2d. 1049 (Utah,
1983).

Further, the court in a quiet title action must not enter

a partial or incomplete decree, but must decide all issues in the
controversy before it so as to afford complete relief. Fisher v.
Davis, 291 P.493

(Utah, 1930), Floor v. Johnson. 199 P.2d

(Utah, 1948), Helman v. Patterson, 241 P.2d. 910

547

(Utah, 1952).

To do otherwise would be to leave property vested in no one or to
invite further litigation.

The Court should define the interests

of the parties before it in and to the property which is the
subject

of

the

quiet

title

action.

Stearns

Ranches

Co.

v.

Archison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co., 96 Cal Rptr. Fisher v.
Davis, supra.
After hearing the evidence, viewing the exhibits and concluding the trial of the matter, the trial court confirmed the
property interests of the parties before the Court on appeal as
set forth in the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree,
based upon the strength of the showing each party made as to its
claim of title.

In its addendum at page 1, the Respondent has

set forth a schematic diagram showing the title claimed by each
party to the quiet title action, and the decree of the Court as
to each party's interest.
Maud and Gilbert Kimball claimed sole ownership of all of
the parcel

here

in

dispute.

The

claim

Kimball was based upon a 1940 tax deed

of

Gilbert

and

Maud

to Robert Kimball and

Digitized by the
Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
J. Reuben 4,
Clark Law
BYU. Upon execution
Gilbert Kimball.
(Plaintiff's
Exhibit
p. School,
91).
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

<

and delivery of the 1940 tax deed, title became vested in Gilbert
Kimball

and

Robert

Kimball

as

tenants

in

common,

and

there

neither appeared of record nor was there before the Court any
subsequent conveyance of Robert's interest predating his death in
1976.

In 1976 Gilbert Kimball recorded a quit claim deed which

provided a metes and bounds description of the parcel intended to
be conveyed by the 1940 tax deed. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 4, p. 101,
Deposition of Gilbert Kimball, p. 41, 42, 53 and 54). The deed's
description

was constructed

from

the descriptions

of

adjacent

parcels conveyed by the Kimballs over the years, with the remaining parcel

constituting

the

corrected

deeded parcel. (T. 55, 56, 57).

description

of

the

tax

The deed operated to convey to

Gilbert and Maud Kimball, as joint tenants and not as tenants in
common, the co-tenancy interest of Gilbert Kimball in the subject
parcel.

An error in the 1976 Quit Claim Deed was corrected by

the filing of a corrected quit claim deed in 1977

(Plaintiff's

Exhibit 4, p. 102).
During the course of the proceedings, Gilbert Kimball passed
away. (R. 117, 118)

By operation of law, the interest of Gilbert

Kimball as a joint tenant in the cotenancy

interest passed to

Maud Kimball.
Robert

Kimball's

co-tenancy

interest

passed

to

Elizabeth

Kimball by heirship pursuant to the Will of Robert Kimball and
the provisions
provided

of the Will and Decree

of Distribution, which

for the distribution of all property not specifically

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

described therein to Elizabeth Kimball as the sole heir of Robert
Kimball.

(R. 129-131, Defendant's Exhibit F-19)

During the course of the proceedings and after the publication of service of summons upon all parties, Elizabeth Kimball
quit-claimed
Fletcher.

her

50%

cotenancy

interest

(Defendant's Exhibit F-17)

to

Melvin

and

Peggy

Thereafter, Mr. and Mrs.

Fletcher amended their pleadings to crossclaim and counterclaim
against Maud Kimball and the Sweeney Land Company, praying for
partition of the subject parcel as set forth more specifically in
the crossclaim and counterclaim.

(R. 177-180)

Subsequently, but

also during the course of the proceedings, Mr. and Mrs. Fletcher
quit-claimed

to

Sweeney

Land

Company

all

of

their

co-tenancy

interest in the disputed parcel north of the centerline of the
30-foot strip. (R. 322-330).
Sweeney Land Company claimed title to a 30-foot strip of the
subject property through mesne conveyances beginning with a deed
from George A.

Snyder

to Park City

Smelting Co.

(Plaintiff's

Exhibit 4, p. 4%). Neither that deed, nor any subsequent conveyances

under

which

Sweeney's

predecessors

claim,

contains

an

ascertainable description, due to the failure of each deed to
describe the easterly boundary of the 30-foot strip.

Due to the

indeterminate description of the deeds under which Sweeney claims
ownership, the Court determined that the only root of title for
the Sweeney Land Company at the time of trial was the deed to it
from Melvin and Peggy Fletcher, which conveyed to Sweeney Land
Company

the 50% cotenancy

interest originally

owned by Robert

Digitized
by thedisputed
Howard W. Hunterparcel
Law Library, J.lying
Reuben Clark
Law School,of
BYU.the centerline
Kimball in all
the
north
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of the 30-foot strip.

The land so conveyed included all of the

Herschiser parcel and all other land north of the centerline of
the 30-foot strip claimed by Sweeney Land Company

in its com-

(Parcels 1 and 2 as shown on page 1 of the addendum

plaint.
hereto).

The Court evaluated the claims of the parties based upon the
root of title of each party and the strength of each party's
title.

The

Court

found

that

no

party

had

responded

to

the

service by publication of summons and therefore any parties who
may have been entitled to represent the interest of Ed Herschiser
in the Herschiser

parcel were

therefore in default.

not before

(T. 18, 19)

the

Court

and

were

Upon proof by the Fletchers

and Kimballs that the 1976 Quit Claim Deed accurately described
the

property

intended

to

be

conveyed

by

the

1940

tax

deed,

(Deposition of Gilbert Kimball, p. 41, 42, 53, and 54) the Court
found that the 1940 tax deed constituted a valid root of title
for

Gilbert

and

subject parcel.

Robert

Kimball

and

their

(Finding of Fact, No. 8)

successors

to

the

The Court found that

Melvin and Peggy Fletcher had acquired by deed the interest of
Elizabeth

Kimball, who

had

succeeded

by

testacy

to

the 50%

cotenancy interest of Robert Kimball.
Although Sweeney Land Company claimed to have paid taxes on
the 30-foot strip, the Court found that possession by Melvin and
Peggy Fletcher of the 30-foot
effectively
those

prevented

parcels

by

strip and the Herschiser parcel

any other party

adverse

from acquiring

possession.

(Transcript

of

title to
Courtfs

by the HowardSweeney
W. Hunter Law Library,
Clark Law School,
Ruling, p. 4)Digitized
Neither
LandJ. Reuben
Company
nor BYU.
Kimballs contest
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

that finding here.
show

possession,

Since no party other than Fletchers could
the

Court

determined

that,

notwithstanding

claims of payment of taxes by Sweeney and Kimballs, no party
could gain ownership by adverse possession and that the only
theories upon which any party could prevail were the theories of
conveyance by deed or by operation of law.
The Kimballs claimed to have extinguished the co-tenancy
interest of Robert Kimball by adverse possession.

The burden of

proving adverse possession against a co-tenant is formidable and
requires proof of conduct of the most open and notorious nature
placing the co-tenant on notice of the disavowal of the cotenancy
and the intended adverse possession.

Olwell v. Clark, 658, P.2d.

585 (Utah, 1982) . Kimballs rely solely on their payment of taxes
on the property and failed to present any evidence of intended
adverse possession or of conduct sufficient to put Robert Kimball
on notice that they intended to take any action adverse to the
interest of Robert Kimball.

(Finding of Fact, No. 14)

The

evidence presented by the Kimballs in support of their claim of
extinguishment of Robert's interest was the testimony of Maud
Kimball (R. 148, 149) and the deposition of Gilbert Kimball (p.
52) that Gilbert believed that he had failed to pay the taxes for
a period of years after acquiring the parcel pursuant to the 1940
tax deed, and that he had reacquired the parcel by tax sale in
his name only from Summit County, thereby foreclosing any claims
by or through Robert.

It is doubtful that, even had such an

action occurred, Gilbert would have successfully extinguished
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Robert's interest given the holding of Olwell, supra, and the
cases cited therein.
In this case, the Court

found, after examining the tax

rolls, that the property had failed to go to tax sale as described by Gilbert, and that title to the property therefore
remained vested in Gilbert and Robert as co-tenants pursuant to
the 1940 tax deed, and in their heirs and successors in interest.
POINT II
SWEENEY LAND COMPANY DID NOT MEET ITS BURDEN
OF PROOF TO DEMONSTRATE TITLE TO THE 30-STRIP.
Sweeney Land Company claims ownership of a 30-foot strip of
land pursuant

to a series of conveyances beginning

in 1883.

Nowhere in Sweeney's claimed chain of title, however, is the
eastern

terminus of the 30-foot

strip described.

There are

references to a "30-foot by 90 foot strip" (T. 87, 88) and a
strip extending to the "middle of the block" (T. 89), but there
exists no description of an eastern terminus of the 30-foot strip
in Sweeney's chain of title

until

Sweeney

Land

Company had

prepared a survey of the 30-foot strip showing it to extend from
Park Avenue to Pacific Avenue, a distance of 160.96 feet (T. 88).
To conflict with the property the subject of this appeal, the
30-foot strip would have to extend east farther that 99 feet from
Park Avenue. (T. 89)
The evidence showed, and the Court expressly found, that the
claimed root of title of Sweeney Land Company to the portion of
the 30-foot strip in controversy was an 1892 deed from the Snyder
Estate to Edmund Thiriot, which described the land by reference
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

to another deed dated November 13, 1883, in favor of Pobert C.
Chambers. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 4, p. 13%, Finding of Fact, No.7).
The 1883 deed is missing, not of record and was not in evidence.
Subsequent deeds to Sweeney's predecessors also refer to the 1883
deed for the description of the 30-foot strip claimed by Sweeney
Land Company.
A deed which does not sufficiently describe boundaries to
render them capable of reasonable ascertainment does not convey
any interest, (Howard v. Howard, 367 P.2d. 193 (Utah, 1962)) and
is a nullity.

The Court held that the open-ended description of

the 30-foot strip rendered the conveyances in Sweeney's chain of
title insufficient to vest the Sweeney Land Company with title to
the property it claimed.

Sweeney's own expert testified that the

eastern boundary of the 30-foot strip was described based upon
his "best judgment" rather than upon any objectively ascertainable description (T. 48, 49).
The brief of Sweeney Land Company erroneously asserts that
the claim of the Kimballs (and thus the Fletchers) to the 30-foot
strip is by adverse possession.

That is simply not the case.

Kimballs1 and Fletchers' title is pursuant to the 1940 tax deed
as a amended by the 1976 quit claim deed.

As indicated above, no

party to this action was able to show coincident possession and
payment of taxes, and the Decree of Quiet Title is therefore
based upon title by deed and by operation of law, not upon
adverse possession.
Because of the failure of Sweeney Land Company to prove its
by the Howard W.strip
Hunter Law by
Library,
J. Reuben Clark
School, BYU.
own title to Digitized
the 30-foot
deed,
theLawCourt
found that the
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

only valid source of title of Sweeney Land Company to the subject
property was the quit-claim deed from Melvin and Peggy Fletcher,
conveying the 50% co-tenancy interest received
Kimball, rooted

in the 1940 tax deed

from Elizabeth

to Robert and Gilbert

Kimball,
POINT III
THE COURT HEARD THE OBJECTIONS OF THE APPELLANTS
TO THE PROPOSED FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND DECREE
ON TWO OCCASIONS, OVERRULED THE OBJECTIONS AND
EXPRESSLY FOUND THAT ITS RULING WAS ACCURATELY
SET FORTH IN THE FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND DECREE.
The Court issued a verbal ruling from the bench the day
after the trial concluded and requested that the counsel for the
Fletchers prepare Findings, Conclusions and Decree accordingly.
(Transcript of the Court's Ruling).

Counsel thereafter undertook

the task of preparing the Findings, Conclusions and Decree which
are before the Court on a appeal.

The proposed Findings, Con-

clusions and Decree were delivered to the Appellants and they
filed a timely objections.

The Court heard the objections of the

Appellants and overruled them, stating that the Findings, Conclusions and Decree accurately represented

the intent of the

Court's ruling and were consistent with the Court's ruling.
Court also denied the Kimball's Motion for a new trial.

The

Neither

Appellant prepared or submitted alternative Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law or a proposed Decree of Quiet Title for
consideration by the Court.

The Appellants objected once again

to the Findings, Conclusions and Decree and a further hearing was
held by the Court.

After the final hearing by the Court, the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Court executed the Findings, Conclusions and Decree, overruled
the objections and denied the motion for new trial.
The Appellants argue that the verbal ruling of the Court was
inconsistent
signed

by

with

the

the

Court

responsibility.

Findings, Conclusions
and

that

the

Court

and

has

Decree

later

"abrogated"

its

The issues concerning the interpretation of the

Courtfs verbal ruling and the final written Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Decree of Quiet Title were fully heard by
the Court on two occasions and the objections of the Appellants
were considered and overruled.

The Appellants cite Silliman v.

Powell, 642, P.2d. 388, (Utah, 1982) to support their argument
that the trial court's ruling should be rejected
and

uncertainty.

The

Findings

of

Fact

succeptible of only one interpretation.
guity or uncertainty.
before

the

Court

were

and

for ambiguity

Conclusions

are

There exists no ambi-

By Appellant's own admission the issues
complex.

Notwithstanding

the

apparent

discrepancy between the Court's verbal ruling and the written
Findings
object.

and

Conclusions, all

the parties

had

opportunity

to

It is well established that the findings and judgment

of the trial court in a quiet title action, will be presumed
valid and will not be disturbed if there is substantial evidence
in the record to support it.

Ash v. State, supra.

The Court

expressly determined that its ruling was accurately represented
by the Findings, Conclusion and Decree.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

POINT IV
THE APPELLANTS MAY NOT PREVAIL ON APPEAL
AS
THE
DECREE
IS
CONSISTENT
WITH
AND
PREJUDICIAL TO THE APPELLANT'S INTERESTS.

INSOFAR
IS NOT

Each Appellant in this case was decreed property interests
by the Court exceeding the original claims set forth in its complaint,

Sweeney

Land

Company

was awarded

more

land

than it

originally claimed.

However, the land was awarded to them in co-

tenancy

Kimball.

with

Maud

Apparently

Sweeney

Land

Company

objects to the award of the interest deeded to it by Melvin and
Peggy Fletcher.
prejudicial

to

The Findings of the Court were not, however,
Sweeney

Land

awarded

lands to the Sweeney

claimed

by

Sweeney

Land

Company

in

that

Land Company

Company

in

the

they

expressly

in excess of those
easterly

end

of

the

30-foot strip.
The

Court

scribed

in

the

affirmed
1976

Kimballs'

Quit

Claim

interest
Deed,

but

in

the parcel de-

Kimballs

fail

to

recognize the co-tenancy interest created by the 1940 tax deed to
Gilbert

and

Robert Kimball and

fail to recognize

the

express

findings of the Court that the co-tenancy created special obligations as between the co-tenants, and that actions taken by one
co-tenant

are considered

to be actions on behalf of both co-

tenants.
During the proceedings before the trial court, a sum equal
to

one-half

Kimball

of

the

property

taxes

paid

by

Gilbert

and

Maud

from the time of the 1940 tax deed were deposited

in

Court by the Fletchers in recognition of the right a co-tenant
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

may have against another co-tenant for contribution toward the
preservation of the co-tenancy estate.
court

finds

that

the

funds

on

The ruling of the trial
deposit

are

sufficient

contribution, and therefore awards judgment to Maud Kimball for
the funds on deposit with the Clerk of the Court.
The ruling of the Court is particularly not prejudicial to
the Kimballs in that the Court, in the written Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Decree, confirms the 1976 Quit-Claim deed
executed by Gilbert Kimball.
The Kimballs did not petition the Court for partition, nor
did the Kimballs present any evidence to the Court of any other
partition plan which would be more fair or equitable.

It was the

consistent position of the Kimballs throughout the trial, and it
is again raised in this appeal, that the co-tenancy interest of
Pobert Kimball was somehow extinguished by the actions of Gilbert
and Maud Kimball, a contention the trial court dismissed.

POINT V
THE OTHER ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR RAISED
BY APPELLANTS ARE WITHOUT MERIT.
Appellants

Kimball

argue

that

Sweeney's

and

claims are barred by the Statute of Limitations.

Fletcher's

As discussed

above, the Kimballs took no action which would either put the
other parties on notice of their claims, or trigger the running
of the statute of limitations

(See Olwell v. Clark, supra).

Similarly, Kimballs assert that Sweeney's and Fletchers' claims
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

are

barred

"claim".

by

Laches

and

Estoppel

for

failure

to

assert

a

Again, there was no action on the part of the Kimballs

that should have precipitated a "claim" by the Fletchers or by
Sweeney until recordation of the 1976 Quit Claim Deed.
The Kimballs1 claim to adverse possession is without merit
because, as forth above, the Court found no coincident possession
and

payment

of property

taxes

in any of the parties

for the

requisite seven years.
The Kimballs1 assertion that Fletcher's recordation of the
"Notice of Probate Distribution" constitutes slander of title is
groundless

because

the

Notice

affects

only

the

interests

of

Robert Kimball in the property and not the 50% cotenancy of the
Kimballs.
The Kimballs1 argument that title to the Kimball interests
is vested in the estate of Gilbert Kimball is in direct contradiction of the Courtfs finding that the 1976 Quit Claim Deed is a
correction of the original 1940 tax deed.

(Finding of Fact No.

8 ) , and is unsupported by the evidence.
The
property

Kimballs1
inequitably

argument
comes

that

in the

the

Court

face of

partitioned

the

fact

that

the
the

Kimballs offered no alternative partition plan.
Sweeney Land Company is barred by its Stipulation with the
Fletchers from claiming any interest in the property adverse to
that of the Fletchers.

By Stipulation signed May 31, 1984 and

approved by the Court. (R. 322-330), Sweeney Land company agreed
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that all the claims of Sweeney "are resolved and settled" with
the exchange of the properties mentioned therein

(at R. 324) .

Sweeney now claims ownership of the south half of the 30-foot
strip, title to which was quieted in the Fletchers, in derogation
of their Stipulation, and should be barred from so doing.
CONCLUSION
The issue of the payment of property taxes is non-issue.
The trial court based its decision on title by deed and operation
of law, not on title by adverse possession.

Only the 1940 Tax

Deed as amended by the 1976 Quit Claim Deed was found to constitute a valid root of title.

Sweeney's Quit Claim Deed was based

on insufficient prior deeds, and therefor was neither sufficient
itself, nor a "correction" of a prior valid conveyance, and was
therefore a nullity.
The Kimballs1 claims of extinguishment of Robert Kimball's
interest, adverse possession and the running of the statute of
limitations all failed for lack of supporting evidence.
Based upon the evidence adduced and upon the law of property
as it relates to quiet title actions, the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Decree of Quiet Title entered by the Court
are proper and should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this l£fch day of November, 1986.
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AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING
STATE OF UTAH
ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)
GERALD H. KINGHORN, being duly sworn, says:
That he is employed in the office of Kapaloski,
Kinghron & Peters, attorneys for Counterclaim-crossclaimants and
Respondents, Melvin and Peggy Fletcher•
That he mailed four (4) true and accurate copies of
Respondents1 Brief upon the parties to the within described
action by placing a true and correct copy thereof in any envelope
addressed to
Robert Felton, Esq.
Attorney for Defendants and Respondents,
Gilbert Kimball and Maud Kimball
5 Triad Center, Suite 585
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180
Paul D. Veasy
Biele, Haslam & Hatch
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant,
Sweeney Land Company
50 West Broadway, Fourth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
and by placing the same with the United-States Post Office, first
class, postage prepaid, on the l^th #ay of November, 1986.

SUBSCRIBED
November, 19 86.
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to before me
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My Commission Expires:
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